

# Preference measurement and application to choice theory

Lavoslav Čaklović  
Faculty of Natural Sciences/Dept. of Math.

Biostat 2019 – Zagreb, 5–8 june

# Contents

## 1 Table of contents

## 2 General remarks

A brief history

Human vs. exact sciences

## 3 Random choice

Stochastic preference

Representation theorem

Visual representation of choice

Flow representation of choice

Axiom of choice. Luce

Ballots. Example

Generators of choice data

A puzzle

## 4 Addendum

Value difference measurement

Measurable value function

Qualitative probability

Potential Method

## A brief history (which concerns out topic only)

- Borda (1784) vs. Condorcet (1785) (still today)
- Thurston (1927) introduced pairwise comparison.
- Morgenstern and John von Neumann (1944) — utility theory.
- Savage (1954) reconstruction of attributes and objects probabilities from preferences (axiomatic approach).

Background: probability.

## A brief history (which concerns out topic only)

- Borda (1784) vs. Condorcet (1785) (still today)
- Thurston (1927) introduced pairwise comparison.
- Morgenstern and John von Neumann (1944) — utility theory.
- Savage (1954) reconstruction of attributes and objects probabilities from preferences (axiomatic approach).

Background: probability.

Probability is the special case of value function with the axiom of 'independence' (de Finetti).

## A brief history (which concerns out topic only)

- Borda (1784) vs. Condorcet (1785) (still today)
- Thurston (1927) introduced pairwise comparison.
- Morgenstern and John von Neumann (1944) — utility theory.
- Savage (1954) reconstruction of attributes and objects probabilities from preferences (axiomatic approach).

Background: probability.

Probability is the special case of value function with the axiom of 'independence' (de Finetti).

- Supes, Tversky, Luce, Kranz, Roberts (1974), Foundations of Measurement I-II (**What is the measurement?**)

## A brief history (which concerns out topic only)

- Borda (1784) vs. Condorcet (1785) (still today)
- Thurston (1927) introduced pairwise comparison.
- Morgenstern and John von Neumann (1944) — utility theory.
- Savage (1954) reconstruction of attributes and objects probabilities from preferences (axiomatic approach).

Background: probability.

Probability is the special case of value function with the axiom of 'independence' (de Finetti).

- Supes, Tversky, Luce, Kranz, Roberts (1974), Foundations of Measurement I-II (**What is the measurement?**)

**What is time?**

## Human vs. exact sciences (again and again)

Humanity (nature)

Techniques (mind)

*value difference measurement*

*extensive measurement*

preference intensity

measurement unit

half, double

archimedean axiom

consistency

precision

concatenation

algebra

structure

equation

probability

statistics

quality

quantity

feedback

max/min

*behaviour*

*convergence*

Scientists in humanity are using (imitating) the methods from exact sciences. They should develop their own mathematics.

A solution → *Potential Method.* 

# Stochastic preference

$S$  — set of states (objects).

$p_{ab}$  — propensity of choosing state  $a$  if the pair of states  $(a, b)$  is offered ( $p_{aa} = \frac{1}{2}, \forall a \in S$ ). We suppose that  $0 < p_{ab} < 1$  and

$$p_{ab} + p_{ba} = 1.$$

Let us define a relation on the set of states  $S$

$$a \succcurlyeq b \iff p_{ab} \geq \frac{1}{2}.$$

**Q.** Is it possible to represent the relation  $(S, \succcurlyeq)$  by real function  $V$  such that

$$a \succcurlyeq b \iff V(a) \geq V(b).$$

Existence  $\rightarrow$



## Theorem (Representation theorem for choice)

If  $p_{ab} \neq 0$ ,  $\forall a, b$  satisfies the consistency condition

$$\frac{p_{ab}}{p_{ba}} \cdot \frac{p_{ca}}{p_{ac}} = \frac{p_{cb}}{p_{bc}}, \quad \text{for all } a, b, c \in S, \quad (1)$$

then,  $\succsim$  is transitive and there exists a real function  $V$  such that

$$p_{bc} = \frac{V(b)}{V(b) + V(c)}. \quad (2)$$

Moreover,


$$a \succsim b \iff V(a) \geq V(b),$$

and function  $v(a) = \ln(V(a))$  is **measurable value function**, i.e.

$$(a \leftarrow b) \succsim_e (c \leftarrow d) \iff v(a) - v(b) \geq v(c) - v(d), \quad (3)$$

where  $(a \leftarrow b) \succsim_e (c \leftarrow d) \iff p_{ab} \geq p_{cd}$ .

Visual representation: ratio  $A : B : C = 4 : 3 : 1$



Central point (star) is the representation of  $A : B : C = 4 : 3 : 1$ . This is the consistent case which is equivalent to 3 pairwise ratios:


$$A : B = 4 : 3$$

$$A : C = 4 : 1$$

$$B : C = 3 : 1.$$

Ratio  $A : B : C : D$  may be represented as a point in tetrahedron.

Flow representation: ratio  $A : B : C = 4 : 3 : 1$



Left side: multigraph with parallel edges which represent the ratio.  
 Right side: aggregated graph ready for analysis with Potential Method.

# Axiom of choice


## Axiom (Luce, 1959)

*Suppose  $R$  is a subset of  $S$ ; then the choice probabilities for the choice set  $R$  are assumed to be identical to the choice probabilities for the choice set  $S$  conditional on  $R$  having been chosen, i.e., for  $a \in R$*


$$P_R(a) = P_S(a|R)$$

Consequences (equivalence):


- $p_{ab}p_{bc}p_{ca} = p_{ac}p_{cb}p_{ba}$  (product rule)
- $p_R(a) = \frac{V(a)}{\sum_{x \in R} V(x)}$  (logit, strict utility model)
- consistency

What happens if the axiom of choice is not satisfied and (or)  $p_{ab} = 0$  for some pair  $(a, b)$ ? In that case data are not consistent, we have now value function  $V$ , but we may calculate *potential*  $X$ . 

## Ballot. Example.



most preferred




least preferred

# Generators of choice data

- In a survey:
  - (a) Please choose one possibility from the given four:  $A, B, C, D$ .
  - (b) How sure you are in your choice? (0–100)
- Promotion in marketing.
- Individual choice by triad interface.
- Recommendation (of a restaurant, option, ...)
- Product development
- Public transport (organization)
- ...

## A puzzle

**Question:**  $A : B : C = 2 : 1 : 1 \oplus A : B : C = 1 : 1 : 2$




Both multigraphs we shall aggregate by:

1. ... taking *log* (like choice) and add parallel edges.
2. ... adding parallel edges and *summing* after that.

## Puzzle - continued

**Answer:**  $A : B : C = 2 : 1 : 1 \oplus A : B : C = 1 : 1 : 2$





# Measurable value function

$(S, \succsim)$  — weak preference,  $(S_e, \succsim_e)$  weak preference on the set of *exchanges*.

## Definition (Measurable value function)

Function  $V : S \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  is **measurable value function** if:

$$a \succsim b \Leftrightarrow V(a) \geq V(b) \quad (4)$$

$$(a \leftarrow b) \succsim_e (c \leftarrow d) \Leftrightarrow V(a) - V(b) \geq V(c) - V(d). \quad (5)$$

(4) means that  $V$  is ordinal value function on  $S$ .

(5) means that  $V(a) - V(b)$  is ordinal value function on  $S_e$ .

## Theorem (Necessary and sufficient conditions for MVF)

*Axioms A1–A6 (bellow) are sufficient for existence of measurable value function.*

*Moreover, A1–A4 and A6 are necessary for existence of measurable value function.*

A1. (Weak preference)  $\succcurlyeq$  is weak preference, and  $\succcurlyeq_e$  is weak preference on the set of exchanges.

A2. (Compatibility  $\succcurlyeq$  and  $\succcurlyeq_e$ )  $\forall a, b \in S$

$$a \succcurlyeq b \Leftrightarrow (a \leftarrow b) \succcurlyeq_e (c \leftarrow c), \quad \forall c \in S.$$

A3. (Inversion)  $\forall a, b, c, d \in S$

$$(a \leftarrow b) \succcurlyeq_e (c \leftarrow d) \Leftrightarrow (d \leftarrow c) \succcurlyeq_e (b \leftarrow a).$$

A4. (Concatenation)  $\forall a, b, c, d, e, f$

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} (a \leftarrow b) \succcurlyeq_e (d \leftarrow e) \\ (b \leftarrow c) \succcurlyeq_e (e \leftarrow f) \end{array} \right\} \implies (a \leftarrow c) \succcurlyeq_e (d \leftarrow f).$$

A5. (Solvability)  $(\forall b, c, d \in S) (\exists x \in S)$  tako da je

$$(x \leftarrow b) \sim_e (c \leftarrow d). \quad (\text{a})$$

$(\forall b, c \in S) (\exists x \in S)$  such that

$$(b \leftarrow x) \sim_e (x \leftarrow c). \quad (\text{b})$$

A6. (archimedean) Each strictly bounded standard sequence is finite.

## de Finetti. Qualitative probability.

$S$  — the set and  $(\mathcal{P}(S), \succsim)$  the relation on the set of subsets. We are looking for representation  $P : A \mapsto P(A) \in \mathbb{R}$  such that

$$A \succsim B \iff P(A) \geq P(B). \quad (6)$$

---

<sup>1</sup>Complete and and transitive.

2

## de Finetti. Qualitative probability.

$S$  — the set and  $(\mathcal{P}(S), \succsim)$  the relation on the set of subsets. We are looking for representation  $P : A \mapsto P(A) \in \mathbb{R}$  such that

$$A \succsim B \iff P(A) \geq P(B). \quad (6)$$

Axioms for **qualitative probability**:

Z1 (Completeness)  $\succsim$  is weak preference<sup>1</sup>. Let us denote anti-symmetric and symmetric part by  $\succ$  &  $\sim$ .

---

<sup>1</sup>Complete and transitive.

<sup>2</sup>

## de Finetti. Qualitative probability.

$S$  — the set and  $(\mathcal{P}(S), \succsim)$  the relation on the set of subsets. We are looking for representation  $P : A \mapsto P(A) \in \mathbb{R}$  such that

$$A \succsim B \iff P(A) \geq P(B). \quad (6)$$

Axioms for **qualitative probability**:

Z1 (Completeness)  $\succsim$  is weak preference<sup>1</sup>. Let us denote anti-symmetric and symmetric part by  $\succ$  &  $\sim$ .

Z2 (Independence<sup>2</sup> from common part) For subsets  $A, B, C$  such that  $A \cap C = B \cap C = \emptyset$

$$A \succsim B \iff A \cup C \succsim B \cup C.$$

---

<sup>1</sup>Complete and transitive.

<sup>2</sup>Known in the literature as the *Axiom of independent alternative*. 

## de Finetti. Qualitative probability.

$S$  — the set and  $(\mathcal{P}(S), \succsim)$  the relation on the set of subsets. We are looking for representation  $P : A \mapsto P(A) \in \mathbb{R}$  such that

$$A \succsim B \iff P(A) \geq P(B). \quad (6)$$

Axioms for **qualitative probability**:

Z1 (Completeness)  $\succsim$  is weak preference<sup>1</sup>. Let us denote anti-symmetric and symmetric part by  $>$  &  $\sim$ .

Z2 (Independence<sup>2</sup> from common part) For subsets  $A, B, C$  such that  $A \cap C = B \cap C = \emptyset$

$$A \succsim B \iff A \cup C \succsim B \cup C.$$

Z3 (Nontriviality)  $S > \emptyset$  (strong preference) and  $A \succsim \emptyset, \forall A \subseteq S$ .

<sup>1</sup>Complete and transitive.

<sup>2</sup>Known in the literature as the *Axiom of independent alternative*. 

## Theorem (de Finetti<sup>3</sup>)

*Let us suppose Z1-Z6, then there exist  $P$  such that (6).*

*Z4 (Referent test) Decision maker is capable to identify the event on the probability wheel (PW).*

*Z5 (Continuity)  $\forall A \subset S$  decision maker is capable to identify sector  $\tilde{A}$  on the PW such that  $A \sim \tilde{A}$ .*


*Let us denote by  $\alpha(A)$  the central angle of  $\tilde{A}$ .*

*Z6 (Sure thing principle)  $\alpha(S) = 360^\circ$ .*

---

<sup>3</sup>In fact he almost had a theorem.




Potential Method<sup>4</sup>Incidence matrix  $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$ 

	nodes <sub><math>n</math></sub>				flow
arcs <sub><math>m</math></sub>	A	B	C	D	$\mathcal{F}$
$\alpha$	-1	1	0	0	1

Preference flow  $\mathcal{F}$ 


---

<sup>4</sup>Čaklović (2012); Čaklović and Kurdija (2017)

Potential Method<sup>4</sup>


Preference flow  $\mathcal{F}$

$D$

Incidence matrix  $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$

	nodes <sub><math>n</math></sub>				flow
arcs <sub><math>m</math></sub>	A	B	C	D	$\mathcal{F}$
$\alpha$	-1	1	0	0	1
$\beta$	0	-1	1	0	3

<sup>4</sup>Čaklović (2012); Čaklović and Kurdija (2017)

Potential Method<sup>4</sup> $D$ Incidence matrix  $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$ 


	nodes <sub><math>n</math></sub>				flow
arcs <sub><math>m</math></sub>	A	B	C	D	$\mathcal{F}$
$\alpha$	-1	1	0	0	1
$\beta$	0	-1	1	0	3
$\gamma$	-1	0	1	0	4

Preference flow  $\mathcal{F}$ 

$$\mathcal{F}_\alpha + \mathcal{F}_\beta - \mathcal{F}_\gamma = 0$$

---

<sup>4</sup>Čaklović (2012); Čaklović and Kurdija (2017)

Potential Method<sup>4</sup>Incidence matrix  $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$ 


	nodes <sub>n</sub>				flow
arcs <sub>m</sub>	A	B	C	D	$\mathcal{F}$
$\alpha$	-1	1	0	0	1
$\beta$	0	-1	1	0	3
$\gamma$	-1	0	1	0	4
$\delta$	0	1	0	-1	2
$\epsilon$	0	0	-1	1	2

Preference flow  $\mathcal{F}$ 

$$\mathcal{F}_\alpha + \mathcal{F}_\beta - \mathcal{F}_\gamma = 0$$

---

<sup>4</sup>Čaklović (2012); Čaklović and Kurdija (2017)

Potential Method<sup>4</sup>

Preference flow  $\mathcal{F}$

$$\mathcal{F}_\alpha + \mathcal{F}_\beta - \mathcal{F}_\gamma = 0$$


$$\mathcal{F}_\epsilon + \mathcal{F}_\delta + \mathcal{F}_\beta = 7$$

$\mathcal{F}$  cycle DBCD is not consistent!

Incidence matrix  $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$

	nodes <sub>n</sub>				flow
arcs <sub>m</sub>	A	B	C	D	$\mathcal{F}$
$\alpha$	-1	1	0	0	1
$\beta$	0	-1	1	0	3
$\gamma$	-1	0	1	0	4
$\delta$	0	1	0	-1	2
$\epsilon$	0	0	-1	1	2

<sup>4</sup>Čaklović (2012); Čaklović and Kurdija (2017)

Potential Method<sup>4</sup>

Preference flow  $\mathcal{F}$

$$\mathcal{F}_\alpha + \mathcal{F}_\beta - \mathcal{F}_\gamma = 0$$

$$\mathcal{F}_\epsilon + \mathcal{F}_\delta + \mathcal{F}_\beta = 7$$


$\mathcal{F}$  cycle DBCD is not consistent!

Incidence matrix  $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$

	nodes <sub>n</sub>				flow
arcs <sub>m</sub>	A	B	C	D	$\mathcal{F}$
$\alpha$	-1	1	0	0	1
$\beta$	0	-1	1	0	3
$\gamma$	-1	0	1	0	4
$\delta$	0	1	0	-1	2
$\epsilon$	0	0	-1	1	2

$$N(A^\top) \oplus R(A) = \mathbb{R}^m$$

<sup>4</sup>Čaklović (2012); Čaklović and Kurdija (2017)

Potential Method<sup>4</sup>

Preference flow  $\mathcal{F}$

$$\mathcal{F}_\alpha + \mathcal{F}_\beta - \mathcal{F}_\gamma = 0$$

$$\mathcal{F}_\epsilon + \mathcal{F}_\delta + \mathcal{F}_\beta = 7$$

$\mathcal{F}$  cycle DBCD is not consistent!


Incidence matrix  $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$

	nodes <sub>n</sub>				flow
arcs <sub>m</sub>	A	B	C	D	$\mathcal{F}$
$\alpha$	-1	1	0	0	1
$\beta$	0	-1	1	0	3
$\gamma$	-1	0	1	0	4
$\delta$	0	1	0	-1	2
$\epsilon$	0	0	-1	1	2

$$N(A^\top) \oplus R(A) = \mathbb{R}^m$$

$$c \oplus \mathcal{F}_o = \mathcal{F}$$

<sup>4</sup>Čaklović (2012); Čaklović and Kurdija (2017)

Potential Method<sup>4</sup>

Preference flow  $\mathcal{F}$

$$F_\alpha + F_\beta - F_\gamma = 0$$

$$F_\epsilon + F_\delta + F_\beta = 7$$

$\mathcal{F}$  cycle DBCD is not consistent!

Incidence matrix  $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$

	nodes <sub>n</sub>				flow
arcs <sub>m</sub>	A	B	C	D	$\mathcal{F}$
$\alpha$	-1	1	0	0	1
$\beta$	0	-1	1	0	3
$\gamma$	-1	0	1	0	4
$\delta$	0	1	0	-1	2
$\epsilon$	0	0	-1	1	2


$$N(A^T) \oplus R(A) = \mathbb{R}^m$$

$$c \oplus \mathcal{F}_o = \mathcal{F}$$

$\mathcal{F}$  is consistent iff  $\mathcal{F} \in R(A)$

<sup>4</sup>Čaklović (2012); Čaklović and Kurdija (2017)



Potential Method<sup>4</sup>

Preference flow  $\mathcal{F}$

$$\mathcal{F}_\alpha + \mathcal{F}_\beta - \mathcal{F}_\gamma = 0$$

$$\mathcal{F}_\epsilon + \mathcal{F}_\delta + \mathcal{F}_\beta = 7$$

$\mathcal{F}$  cycle DBCD is not consistent!

Incidence matrix  $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$

	nodes <sub>n</sub>				flow
arcs <sub>m</sub>	A	B	C	D	$\mathcal{F}$
$\alpha$	-1	1	0	0	1
$\beta$	0	-1	1	0	3
$\gamma$	-1	0	1	0	4
$\delta$	0	1	0	-1	2
$\epsilon$	0	0	-1	1	2


$$N(A^T) \oplus R(A) = \mathbb{R}^m$$

$$c \oplus \mathcal{F}_o = \mathcal{F}$$

$\mathcal{F}$  is consistent iff  $\mathcal{F} \in R(A)$

$\mathcal{F}$  is consistent iff  $AX = \mathcal{F}$

<sup>4</sup>Čaklović (2012); Čaklović and Kurdija (2017)

Potential Method<sup>4</sup>

Preference flow  $\mathcal{F}$

$$\mathcal{F}_\alpha + \mathcal{F}_\beta - \mathcal{F}_\gamma = 0$$

$$\mathcal{F}_\epsilon + \mathcal{F}_\delta + \mathcal{F}_\beta = 7$$

$\mathcal{F}$  cycle DBCD is not consistent!

Incidence matrix  $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$

	nodes <sub>n</sub>				flow
arcs <sub>m</sub>	A	B	C	D	$\mathcal{F}$
$\alpha$	-1	1	0	0	1
$\beta$	0	-1	1	0	3
$\gamma$	-1	0	1	0	4
$\delta$	0	1	0	-1	2
$\epsilon$	0	0	-1	1	2

$$N(A^T) \oplus R(A) = \mathbb{R}^m$$

$$c \oplus \mathcal{F}_o = \mathcal{F}$$

$\mathcal{F}$  is consistent iff  $\mathcal{F} \in R(A)$

$\mathcal{F}$  is consistent iff  $AX = \mathcal{F}$

$\mathcal{F}$  is consistent iff  $c \perp \mathcal{F}, \forall c$

$$c \in N(A^T) \text{ cycle}$$

<sup>4</sup>Čaklović (2012); Čaklović and Kurdija (2017)

## Potential of preference graph

$A$  — incidence matrix,  $n = \#\text{Vertices}$ ,  $m = \#\text{Arcs}$ .

$\mathcal{F}$  — preference flow.

Ranking of the vertices is given by *potential*  $X$ :

$$A^T A X = A^T \mathcal{F}.$$

$A^T \mathcal{F}$  — flow gain in vertices

$L = A^T A$  — *Laplace matrix* of the graph.

## Potential of preference graph

$A$  — incidence matrix,  $n = \#\text{Vertices}$ ,  $m = \#\text{Arcs}$ .

$\mathcal{F}$  — preference flow.

Ranking of the vertices is given by *potential*  $X$ :

$$A^T A X = A^T \mathcal{F}.$$

$A^T \mathcal{F}$  — flow gain in vertices


$L = A^T A$  — *Laplace matrix* of the graph.

For connected graph, the matrix  $A$  has range  $n - 1$ , the kernel is generated by the vector of ones  $\mathbb{1} = [1, 1, \dots, 1]^T$ . For uniqueness of  $X$  we put the condition

$$\sum_{i=1}^n x_i = 0.$$


# Konsistency (bis)

Konsistentan graf



A — B — C — D

Nekonsistentan graf



A — B — C — D

# Bibliografija

- Čaklović, L. (2012). Measure of Inconsistency for the Potential Method. In Torra, V., Narukawa, Y., López, B., and Villaret, M., editors, *MDAI*, volume 7647 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, pages 102–114. Springer.
- Čaklović, L. and Kurdija, A. S. (2017). A universal voting system based on the Potential Method. *European Journal of Operational Research*, 259:677–688.
- Roberts, F. S. and Luce, R. D. (1968). Axiomatic Thermodynamics and Extensive Measurement. *Synthese*, 18(4):311–326.